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1. How Does Moral Progress Happen?
John Newton was a seaman and captain in the African slave trade 
in the mid-18th century. As a seaman, he raped female slaves carried 
on board. On one of his voyages, 28% of the slaves died. As a captain, 
he presided over the chaining and confinement of hundreds of slaves in 
suffocating, filthy, disease-ridden holds, where many died of dysentery 
in pools of diarrhea. He tortured slave boys with thumbscrews to extract 
information about a planned onboard insurrection. He sold some of his 
slaves to a planter in Antigua, who told him of his plan to work them to 
death and then buy new ones.2
 In the course of his sailing career he often narrowly escaped death. 
Each time he survived, he felt that God had rescued him, and took this as a 
sign to lead a more Christian life. On one of his voyages, upon recovering 
from fever, he felt “delivered from the power and dominion of sin.” Such 
experiences led him to give up swearing, and, as captain, to lead his crew 
in prayer services every day. But his sense of personal sin did not include 
his participation in the slave trade. Indeed, he claimed that there was no 
better calling “for promoting the life of God in the soul” than in voyages to 
Africa, and that he “never knew sweeter of more frequent hours of divine 
communion” than in his two last voyages to Guinea, where he spent his 
time in revery with God as his despairing cargo was forced aboard his 
ship, shackled, and stuffed into the hold.3
After retiring from the slave trade, Newton became an ordained 
Anglican priest, most famous for writing the beloved hymn “Amazing 
Grace.” In 1781, he delivered a sermon condemning England for a long 
list of sins, including a large national debt. He didn’t mention slavery. 
He said nothing against slavery until writing Thoughts upon the African 
Slave Trade, an influential eyewitness contribution to the growing aboli-
tionist movement, more than 30 years after he left the trade.4 Only upon 
being persuaded by abolitionists of the importance of his testimony did it 
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dawn on him that he had done anything wrong. He wrote that he found it 
humiliating that he had engaged in such a cruel and unjust traffic, which 
“contradicts the feelings of humanity,” but confessed that at the time “he 
never had a scruple” about it.5
Today we look upon Newton’s moral obliviousness with uneasy won-
der. Newton was no sociopath, incapable of any moral feelings. Indeed 
he was overcome with guilt over his habit of swearing. It is one thing, 
perhaps, to have only dim feelings about injustices far away, of which one 
reads only second-hand, and to which one has at most an indirect causal 
connection. But to commit and command the grossest cruelties, to see, hear, 
and smell its effects on one’s victims close at hand, and to be so lacking 
in moral feeling as to regard oneself as at the same time delivered from 
sin and in communion with God — how could that be? 
Newton’s biography encapsulates, in compressed form, the stunning 
transformation of moral consciousness that swept across Europe and the 
Americas, and eventually the whole world, concerning the wrongfulness 
of slavery. Three hundred years ago, few people claimed that slavery was 
wrong. Starting about 250 years ago, various groups began to challenge 
the legitimacy of slavery. This led to a steady series of legal abolitions 
in the Americas, beginning with the French colony of Saint-Domingue 
(now Haiti) in 1794, and completed with Brazil in 1888. Mauritania, the 
last remaining country to legally recognize slavery, abolished it in 1981. 
Although de facto slavery persists in many areas of the world, virtually no 
one is willing to publicly defend it. Slavery stands today as a paradigmatic 
moral wrong. The transformation of moral consciousness that underwrote 
the abolition of slavery represents perhaps the most profound instance of 
moral progress the world has ever seen.
Historians have much to teach us about how this remarkable trans-
formation of worldwide moral consciousness came about. I am interested 
in two related normative questions. First, how do we know that this 
transformation amounts to a case of moral progress? Of course, when we 
judge matters by the lights of our current moral beliefs it appears to be 
so. I am interested in how we can know we have improved our morals in 
a non-question-begging way. Second, can we draw from this case study 
any general lessons on how to improve our morals?
I limit the scope of my inquiry to a particular domain of morality, 
concerning what human beings owe to each other. I set aside questions 
about the good life generally, to focus on the narrower question of moral 
right and wrong. I also set aside any notions of freefloating sin or wrong-
doing unconnected to duties toward other human beings — for example, 
ideas about duties to self or to God. Henceforth, when I speak of morality, 
I am concerned with duties directed toward other people.
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My interest is in the moral practices of social groups, more or less 
consciously supported by shared moral beliefs. In all ages there have been 
individuals who have questioned the morality of slavery. My concern is not 
to explain individual moral change, or change in beliefs alone, but rather 
how groups can improve their moral practices and supporting beliefs in 
tandem. My approach is also naturalistic. I am interested in identifying 
real practices of moral improvement, in how groups actually manage to 
improve their practices. 
2. Pragmatism, Morality, and Moral Progress 
I propose to investigate the question of moral progress from a prag-
matist perspective, taking John Dewey’s moral theory as a starting point. 
Dewey offered a naturalistic account of the place of morality in human 
societies. He began by considering our pervasive interdependence. Hu-
mans are social beings, who cannot survive or achieve their ends without 
assistance from, and cooperation and coordination with, others. The need 
for assistance, cooperation, and coordination is so constant that it cannot 
be secured by ad hoc arrangements. People institute rules of conduct — 
embodied in conventions, customs, norms, and laws — to secure regular 
assistance, cooperation, and coordination from each other.6 Conventions, 
customs, and nonmoral norms are sustained by mutual expectations of 
conditional conformity — shared understandings of most people’s dis-
position to conform to the rules on condition that others do, too. People 
may also apply sanctions to nonconformists, and some of the motivation 
to comply may be to avoid expected sanctions. 
Moral norms, like social norms and conventions, are largely sustained 
through shared expectations of conditional conformity, backed up by ex-
pectations of sanction. We must distinguish here the motive to conform 
from the content of moral demands. The content of moral demands, unlike 
the content of commitments to social norms, is not typically conditional 
on others’ conformity. The fact that others are killing, lying, and stealing 
does not give anyone else permission to do the same. However, few people 
will comply with moral demands out of pure moral conscience alone, 
if others reject those demands. If only hypocrites demand compliance, 
people will tend to judge the purported moral demands to be fraudulent 
and lacking real authority. As with social norms, most people go along 
with moral norms because they expect others to expect them to comply, 
and they expect others to comply themselves. Deliberate sanctions may 
also elicit conformity to moral norms, but mostly for those at the margins 
of compliance. If people only conform to a norm out of fear of sanctions, 
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and not out of general expectations of acceptance and approval of it within 
the group, the norm will lack legitimacy and tend to lose its grip over time.
There is not a sharp distinction between moral and social norms, but 
moral norms are more likely to have four features. First, they purport to 
carry the force of authoritative command, and are typically expressed in 
the form of demands or orders to comply, as opposed to weaker sorts of 
claims such as requests, supplications, and expectations. Second, confor-
mity with moral norms may be exacted from people. Failure to comply is 
liable to lead to coercion, condemnation, blame and punishment, above 
and beyond other sorts of social sanction, as of disapproval or nonmoral 
penalties (as when a fouled basketball player gets a free throw as a pen-
alty on the fouling team). Third, the authority of moral commands does 
not depend on any immediate or direct good that the person addressed 
happens to want.7 Finally, shared moral expectations are colored by 
shared emotional dispositions. Within the group accepting the moral 
norm, members approve of conformity, are angry at violators, resent the 
violation if they are injured by it, and feel shame or guilt at violating the 
moral norm themselves. 
The scope of the authority of any given moral norm is not fully de-
termined in advance. Hence people may issue conflicting moral claims 
on each other even in cases where they agree on all of the relevant facts. 
One person’s claim of need may conflict with another’s claim of desert. 
Or a person may claim an excuse or justification for breaking a promise 
by appealing to an unanticipated vital personal interest — for example, 
she broke a lunch date because she was suddenly called for a job inter-
view. People may then appeal to higher-order moral principles, such as 
the Golden Rule, to adjudicate their conflicting claims. From a pragmatist 
point of view, the basic function of higher-order moral principles is to 
adjudicate conflicting moral claims.
Morality as a social practice becomes reflective — open to recon-
struction through people thinking together how they will govern their 
interpersonal claims — in several ways. First, an interpersonal conflict 
may give rise to uncertainty as to how an accepted principle applies to it. 
Even if everyone accepts the Golden Rule, how does it apply to a given 
conflict between claims of need and desert?8 Second, conditions may have 
changed such that the usual and accepted application of a principle gives 
rise to surprising and unsatisfactory consequences, or people come to be 
aware of bad consequences that were not previously connected to the op-
eration of the principle. For example, everyone in a region may have freely 
pumped groundwater from under their own land, on the accepted principle 
that landowners have a legitimate claim to any groundwater beneath their 
land. In drier conditions, or under normal conditions but after a long pe-
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riod of unrestricted pumping, or with advances in hydrology, people may 
learn that each person’s pumping affects the amount of water available to 
others, and that a norm of unrestricted pumping will soon leave everyone 
thirsty. They may then need to devise or revise a property regime for shar-
ing groundwater that includes limits on each person’s pumping.9 Third, 
people may challenge the legitimacy of a customary norm or principle, by 
drawing attention to objectionable features of its operation and failures in 
its purported justification. For example, the abolitionists did not merely 
advance claims of slaves against claims of property; they challenged the 
very legitimacy of claims of property in other persons. 
In practice these three occasions for ascent from customary to reflec-
tive morality may blur together, and other stimuli for reflection may also 
arise — for example, encountering social groups that appear to manage 
their collective lives more effectively using different moral norms and 
principles. Whatever the occasion for moral reflection or moral theoriz-
ing, it arises from something that causes uncertainty or disagreement as 
to how to proceed.10 The reflective resolution of uncertainty or disagree-
ment typically involves investigation into the point of the moral norm or 
principle at issue, whether it is justified, and whether revised principles 
could fulfill the original point better, or whether people’s conduct should 
be coordinated around some different point. In other words, uncertainty 
and disagreement prompt an investigation into the justification of disputed 
norms. It is possible for people to conform to a social or moral norm from 
habit or custom alone, without any idea of its point, as in the case of ta-
boos, where people conform to a norm, the original reason for which was 
forgotten. However, when doubts arise as to how or whether to continue 
to conform, some reflective decision is needed to move forward. People 
assume conscious control over the future course of conduct in part by 
arguing over rationales for rival alternatives.
 The question then arises how to do so intelligently. Pragmatism as 
a mode of moral theorizing does not attempt to offer any ultimate moral 
principle, assumed to apply in all possible worlds, as a way to resolve moral 
conflicts.11 (As noted above, even if we had such a standard, such as the 
Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative, or the Principle of Utility, all of 
the hard work would remain in resolving disputes about how to apply it in 
any particular case.) In place of an ultimate principle, pragmatism offers 
methods for improving our moral norms and principles. These methods 
do not rely on pure thought alone, but on practical action in the world.
I plan to explore two such pragmatist methods here. The first aims 
to correct biases in the thinking that enters into the formulation of moral 
principles. The second aims to test moral principles in practice.
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Consider first how bias-correction works. Suppose we know, through 
long experience, that human beings are prone to certain systematic biases 
in their practical thinking. For example, people tend to be susceptible to 
wishful thinking in formulating policies. Wishful thinking may lead them 
to exaggerate the effects of measures designed to produce some good, 
and hence to adopt those measures even if they don’t really work. Once 
we become aware of this bias, we can take steps to block, counteract, or 
correct its operation. Double-blinding of clinical trials is designed in part 
to block the operation of wishful thinking in assessing the effectiveness 
of new medicines. We have better reason to accept changes in medical 
practice justified on the basis of double-blind studies than changes based 
on unblinded studies, since they are more likely to avoid a known bias. 
Instituting a rule of blinding clinical trials can therefore be expected to 
increase the likelihood that changes in medical practice based on such 
trials amount to progress in clinical care.
While bias-correction works ex ante, in aiding the formulation or 
revision of moral principles and norms prior to implementation, the funda-
mental pragmatist test of moral principles and norms is ex post, based on 
our experiences upon their adoption. To test a moral principle or norm, we 
act in accordance with it and consider whether we can live with the con-
sequences. More precisely, recall that the fundamental function of moral 
principles is to govern our interpersonal claim-making. Moral principles 
aim to solve recurring problems in our interpersonal relationships. For 
example, they establish a division of moral labor by assigning different 
responsibilities to different social roles, to ensure that certain essential 
aims of any viable society — such as reproduction and education of the 
next generation, production of the means of subsistence, and defense of 
society and its members against aggression — are achieved. Principles 
of distributive justice aim to govern the development of rules for fairly 
dividing the gains of social cooperation. Norms of promise-keeping and 
truth-telling aim to secure the conditions of trust between people so that 
they can confidently rely on each other’s skills, diligence, and communi-
cation in undertaking projects that require the cooperation of others. And 
so forth. Because moral principles aim to solve recurring problems in 
our relationships, we can test them by considering whether they actually 
manage to solve the problems they are supposed to solve, whether they 
generate other problems, and whether alternative principles do a better job.
In the course of testing our principles in practice, we may come 
to change our view of the problems it is meant to solve, in light of our 
experiences living with it. For example, most people have come to reject 
the Catholic norm prohibiting divorce. This rejection is tied to a revised 
conception of the function of marriage focused on human interests, rather 
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than as the fulfillment of a divine command or sacred good unconnected 
to human flourishing. Against a humanistic standard, the Catholic norm 
can be seen as aiming at stability in the marriage relationship. But it also 
forces misery on couples with irreconcilable differences, and traps bat-
tered women in a state of terror. In light of Catholics’ experiences with 
the rigid no-divorce rule, many have revised their understanding of the 
relational problem this rule is meant to solve — not simply to secure 
stability and mutual commitment of the couple, but to do so compatibly 
with their happiness and safety.
The history of the abolition of slavery utilized both pragmatist 
methods for transforming moral conviction and practice. In section 3, I 
shall discuss how British abolitionists invented one of the most powerful 
social practices ever developed for the peaceful transformation of moral 
consciousness: the social movement. In section 4, I shall explore how 
emancipation was conceived as an experiment in living according to the 
principle of free labor.
3. The Social Movement as Bias Correction of the Powerful
Moral thinking, like causal thinking, is prone to systematic biases. 
Classical social contract theorists defended the necessity and rationality 
of accepting the state in part on the ground that in matters of justice, each 
individual is biased in his own case and so needs a neutral judge with the 
power to enforce impartial laws. The self-serving bias is pervasive. But 
it has asymmetrical effects across social positions. It afflicts the powerful 
more than the powerless, and those with unaccountable power most of 
all. As Dewey observed:
It is difficult for a person in a place of authoritative power to 
avoid supposing that what he wants is right as long as he has 
power to enforce his demand. And even with the best will in the 
world, he is likely to be isolated from the real needs of others, 
and the perils of ignorance are added to those of selfishness. His-
tory reveals the tendency to confusion of private privilege with 
official status. The history of the struggle for political liberty is 
largely a record of attempt to get free from oppressions which 
were exercised in the name of law and authority, but which in 
effect identified loyalty with enslavement.12
The difficulty arises from the fact that knowledge of the right arises 
from certain distinctive experiences: of being held subject to the claims of 
others, which are asserted as authoritative, of being called to account by 
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others, held responsible, blamed, shamed, and punished for wrongdoing, 
being criticized for arrogance, negligence, and other vices, being exposed 
as unable to justify one’s conduct before others whom one has injured or 
neglected. These are the social practices that arouse moral consciousness 
in people, and make them sensible that they are accountable to standards 
of conduct arising from the needs and interests of others, not just to their 
own desires. People in powerful positions tend to insulate themselves from 
the claims of those over whom they exercise power, to censor, discount, or 
misunderstand the claims of those beneath them, and to construct systems 
of law and moral accountability filled with loopholes through which they 
but not others can escape. So they rarely have the characteristic experi-
ences through which they would learn that what they are doing to social 
inferiors is wrong. 
People holding powerful positions are also liable to confuse their own 
power with moral authority, and thereby confuse the self-serving orders 
they give to others with what others are morally obligated to do. Hence 
they are liable to misread challenges to their orders from below as signs 
of vice — of insubordination and insolence, irresponsibility, laziness, and 
so forth. The relatively powerless enjoy no such luxuries. Hence people 
are prone to confuse their own desires with the right in rough proportion 
to their power.
Dewey’s observation raises two distinct charges against the power-
ful: arrogance and ignorance. From their arrogant perspective, even just 
complaints from below appear to them to be vicious. And even if the 
powerful are trying to be just, their superior social position may make 
them ignorant of the interests of others. Hence, to correct these biases 
and reconstruct a more just set of social norms, we need social practices 
that can do three things:
1. Inform the powerful of the needs and interests of the less power-
ful, in a form vivid enough to spur feeling and action respecting those 
needs and interests.
2. Express what is required to respect these needs and interests as 
claims or demands on the powerful to change their conduct in specified 
ways, by confronting them with the characteristic experiences that arouse 
moral consciousness: being held accountable for their conduct, being made 
the object of moral criticism, experiencing their loss of moral authority 
regarding the issue at hand by seeing the claimants reject, defy, and refute 
their counterclaims.
3. Enable the less powerful to display their worthiness, so that they 
can assume some moral authority to contest the counterclaims of the 
powerful, and put authority behind their own claims.
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In cases where the powerful have good will, social practices focused 
on vividly conveying information about the needs and interests of others 
may take center stage. Dramas, novels, songs, posters, photographs, films, 
and other media may make this information both salient and capable of 
spurring a sympathetic response.13 Where arrogance is paired with igno-
rance, additional methods must be devised.
Social theorists have studied such methods. They call “contention” 
any practices in which some people make claims against others, on behalf 
of someone’s interests. “Contentious politics” consists of coordinated 
contention by groups around a shared agenda, involving governments as 
“targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.”14 We can array contentious 
practices along a spectrum from pure moral argument on one pole to 
riots, war, and other violent acts on the other.15 Between pure argument 
and violence is a wide range of contentious activities that are more or less 
disruptive of habitual ways of life, from petitioning, publicity campaigns, 
theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, and political cam-
paigns to street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, 
strikes, and building occupations. As people move beyond the pure moral 
argument pole, they manifest in action and not only words their refusal to 
go along with the moral norms they are rejecting.
Why isn’t pure moral argument enough to induce social change? First, 
moral arguments often take place in contexts divorced from any immediate 
practical need to deliberate. In philosophical works and around the seminar 
table, or in church sermons, such arguments do not directly inform practi-
cal deliberation, because they are addressed to people who confront no 
immediate need to act on the principles being advanced. Moral arguments 
are then taken up as mere speculation, rather than as practical reasoning. 
Second, practically realized moral norms are entrenched in largely 
unreflective habits which are sustained by shared expectations of people’s 
duties and entitlements. As Newton’s example shows, it didn’t even cross 
the minds of participants that the coercion and brutalities they inflicted on 
the slaves were morally wrong; that was just how things were done. After 
exposure to moral argument, a few morally conscientious individuals may 
cease to engage in wrongful conduct. The Quakers began by privately 
freeing their slaves and exiting the slave trade. But personal abstention 
alone does not change social practices. Even after most individuals are 
persuaded that slavery is wrong, that is not enough to change habits 
of conduct underwritten by shared expectations and attitudes. Private 
convictions within a group, even if held by most or all, do not overturn 
longstanding conditional commitments of a group to accept contrary 
convictions, or to act in accordance with them.16 (This point applies with 
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additional force when the challenged practices are underwritten by laws. 
Then, to overturn them, new laws must be enacted.)
To induce practical reasoning, people must be confronted with situ-
ations in which they can no longer carry on with their habitual ways of 
acting. Effective contention, in which large numbers of people manifest 
their opposition to particular norms, triggers practical deliberation over 
alternative norms in three ways. (1) As more people express their opposi-
tion to compliance, the motivation of others to support the norm declines, 
since, as noted, a major motive to comply with moral norms is people’s 
expectation that others expect compliance, and will comply if others do, 
too. (2) As fewer people acquiesce in the norm, it may lose its power to 
solve the problem of interpersonal claim-making that it was supposed to 
solve.17 This may prompt the search for alternative norms that can suc-
ceed in mobilizing general compliance. However, it might rather prompt 
authorities who have stakes in the challenged norm to preserve it by means 
of repression and harsher sanctions. Effective contention may persuade 
authorities of the infeasibility of this route. (3) Contention may impose a 
moral cost on those who insist on upholding the challenged norm: loss of 
moral authority or legitimacy. Authorities may be able to impose their will 
on the contested issue, but lose honor or perceived legitimacy in doing 
so. They may experience this loss of recognition as an injury in itself, and 
discover that they can’t win it back through arguments, bribes, pomp, or 
distractions.18 They may see this loss as threatening their authority to move 
on other issues. If elites are split over the norm, some may see a route to 
power by taking up the cause of the challengers. (Effective contention 
may seek allies among elites to trigger such divisions.) The threatened 
deprivation of moral authority aims to close off repression and open up 
the minds of authorities to practical deliberation over alternatives to the 
challenged norm. 
A particularly important form of contentious politics was invented 
by British abolitionists: the social movement. A social movement is “a 
sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that 
advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and 
solidarities that sustain these activities.”19 Suppose you want to contest 
some policy you think is unjust — say, the abuse of workers in sweatshops 
who make clothes for major apparel companies. What do you do? First, 
you call a meeting of like-minded citizens to organize a campaign to raise 
the wages and improve workplace conditions of the people who supply 
clothing to the company. The group formulates a set of claims it wants 
to make on the company and perhaps on the state, to pass laws requiring 
that the company meet those claims. The group gives itself a name and 
adopts a logo and perhaps a slogan to encapsulate its claims. Everyone 
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supplies their contact information and agrees to a division of labor. The 
group appoints some members to undertake information-gathering: to 
gather testimony from the workers, photograph the awful conditions in 
the sweatshops, document the low wages and abuses, investigate feasible 
alternatives, refute defenses made by the company, and so forth. Others 
design a campaign to publicize this information to the wider public, along 
with the claims the group is making on the company and the state. They 
publish books, flyers, and op-eds, buy advertising in major media, spon-
sor talks and debates, stage plays and spread iconic images that vividly 
illustrate the injustice. Some take charge of recruiting new members, set-
ting up allied committees in other locations, networking and coordinating 
with like-minded groups. They use the mailing list of members to raise 
funds and keep members updated on the progress of the movement. Most 
importantly, they agree to undertake a large-scale concerted and sustained 
campaign of contentious activities to pressure the companies and the state 
to meet the group’s claims. They stage public demonstrations with masses 
of supporters marching in unison, carrying banners, singing songs, chant-
ing slogans, and rallying for speeches in front of major public landmarks. 
They collect thousands of signatures on petitions articulating the claims 
they are making. They file lawsuits advancing their claims in court. They 
demand that the legislature hold public hearings to investigate the injustice. 
They run candidates committed to their cause in elections. They issue 
report cards on how representatives have voted on bills of interest to the 
movement. They may organize a consumer boycott of sweatshop clothing, 
and promote other brands made by better treated workers.
Many of these activities in the repertoire of contention — the logo, 
the mailing list, the network of committees, the iconic image vividly il-
lustrating the complaint, the consumer boycott, the nationwide publicity 
campaign, the report card on representatives — were invented by the 
British abolition movement, which was launched in 1787.20 Others, such 
as petitioning and litigation, had long existed, but were raised to an un-
precedented scale and organization by the movement. Most importantly, 
the abolitionists were the first to put the whole package of contentious 
activities together in a sustained, coordinated campaign that mobilized 
hundreds of thousands of people. In the first phase of the movement, 
which demanded an end to the slave trade, they persuaded about 400,000 
Britons to boycott slave-grown sugar. In 1792 alone, abolitionists submit-
ted 519 petitions to Parliament containing 390,000 signatures, calling for 
the abolition of the slave trade. That was one and a half times the total of 
all signatures on all petitions submitted to Parliament from1765-1784! In 
the second phase of the movement, demanding abolition of slavery itself, 
Thomas Clarkson travelled 10,000 miles, gathering testimony, calling pub-
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lic meetings, recruiting, training, and networking new members.21 In 1807, 
the movement won passage of a bill abolishing the slave trade. In 1833, 
after an electorate expanded by the Reform Bill sent an unprecedented 
number of abolitionists to Parliament, the movement won passage of a 
bill to abolish slavery in the British colonies.
Let’s distinguish two questions about this remarkable transformation 
of moral conviction and practice. First, how did the abolitionist social 
movement succeed in changing moral consciousness? Second, are there 
features of the movement that support the view that the change it effected 
amounted to moral progress?
Regarding the first question, pure moral argument was not sufficient 
to bring about moral change. The arguments that slavery is morally wrong 
were already known before the abolitionist movement got underway. 
Nor did the opposition have much to say for itself on moral grounds. 
The proslavery interests regularly changed the subject from questions 
of moral right and justice to expedience, arguing for slavery on grounds 
of its profitability and the dependence of Britain’s economy on the slave 
system.22 In contrast with proslavery interests in the U.S., which advanced 
elaborate moral arguments for slavery, based in part on racist theories of 
Africans’ incapacity for freedom, British slaveowners disavowed appeals 
to racism in Parliamentary debates.23
The naturalistic pragmatist account of morality as a system for regulat-
ing conduct helps us understand the feebleness of moral argument alone 
in effecting moral change. What is required is practical action to dislodge 
shared expectations, unsettle attitudes, and trigger practical deliberation. 
This requires concerted mass public action, effectively demonstrating a 
collective rejection of the entrenched norms — a dissolution of the prior 
shared expectations — and a determination to replace them with rival 
norms.
At the same time, we should not dismiss moral argument as inert. 
Contention is required to trigger practical deliberation, but deliberation 
makes use of reasons and arguments to find better alternatives to en-
trenched customs. Abolitionists used moral arguments to recruit people 
to their cause, and devoted much of their activity to persuading others 
to act using moral arguments. Against the complacent trust the British 
had in the self-professed benevolence of slave traders and slaveholders 
thousands of miles away in African and the West Indies, the abolitionists 
compiled a vast evidentiary record of monstrous cruelty and abuse of 
slaves. They thereby exposed conflicts of norms that had not previously 
been recognized, and invoked the authority of already accepted norms 
against cruelty, theft (the slave trade was man-stealing, a violation of 
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each person’s self-ownership), and so forth in domains where they had 
not previously been applied.
Do we have reason to regard the moral transformation brought about 
by the abolitionist social movement as a case of moral progress? Of course 
most of us today agree with the arguments the abolitionists made, and 
commend the changes they brought about. Stepping back from our moral 
convictions about this case, however, can we discern in the abolitionist’s 
methods of contention any tendencies to improve moral practice?
According to Charles Tilly, a leading scholar of contentious politics, 
social movements aim to publicly demonstrate four features about them-
selves: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.24 To communicate 
their worthiness, they may dress neatly, practice nonviolence, and appoint 
respected persons, such as ministers, in high positions in their organization. 
To communicate their unity, they may all wear a badge, chant slogans in 
unison, and march in ranks. To demonstrate numbers, they aim for huge 
crowds in public demonstrations and meetings, and gigantic numbers of 
signatures on petitions. To demonstrate commitment, they display their 
readiness to suffer personal sacrifices for their cause: they bear up under 
beatings by police, campaign relentlessly, sometimes to the point of ex-
haustion, expend their fortunes, even stage hunger strikes when in prison.
These features fit in to the tasks a social practice needs to accomplish 
if it is to correct the moral biases of the relatively powerful. Recall that 
those in power are liable to interpret challenges to their norms as mani-
festations of insolence, selfishness, and other vices on the part of the less 
powerful. Public demonstrations of the worthiness of those participating 
in a social movement undermine such interpretations. Demonstrations 
of self-sacrificing commitment undermine attributions of selfish or other 
vicious ulterior motives to the participants, and highlight the moral seri-
ousness of their cause and their motives. Here are people who have the 
courage of their convictions. Public self-sacrifice may also inspire awe 
in observers, a feeling closely associated with a sense that the objects of 
awe bear authority. Large numbers, too, can be awe-inspiring. 
More importantly, numerous publicly displayed protestors making 
claims to overturn reigning norms expose the instability of these norms and 
challenge the authority of those who uphold them. A norm can be sustained 
only if most people believe that most others accept its practical authority. 
Once enough people demonstrate their repudiation of its authority, even 
in the face of official sanctions, others who have acquiesced in the norm 
only from unreflective habit or the expectations of others may waver in 
their support. Now they cannot rely on others’ expectations to shore up 
their own complacent acceptance of the norm. Actual confrontation with a 
mass of claims that conflict with the reigning norm forces them to engage 
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in practical reflection as to whether they should continue to support the 
norm. Do they have real reasons to do so? At this point, moral arguments 
tend to have an impact they would not otherwise have, since they are 
directly connected to resolving practical doubts about how to proceed. 
By contrast, moral reflection is merely speculative when there is no 
particular practical need to deliberate brought about by vivid confronta-
tion with the actual conflicting claims of others, or the bad consequences 
of current norms, or doubts about how to apply given norms. People 
may entertain hypothetical challenges to a norm, but not as voiced by 
actual people complaining about the status quo and calling its support-
ers to account for their conduct. Few people find purely speculative 
individual moral reflection motivating. Because moral norms purport to 
have authority for everyone, and aim to coordinate everyone’s normative 
expectations, how can one be confident that one’s own moral reflections 
are on the right track unless one sees that others are prepared to orient 
their conduct in accordance with them? Moral reasoning, to be effective 
in changing social practices, must be done together. The mobilization of 
large numbers of people supplies a condition for practical social change 
that individual conscientious reflection does not.
What is the significance of unity? A movement that cannot agree on 
what it wants to do will have difficulty persuading others. Disunity within 
the movement would fail to provide a salient focus of critique, and thereby 
cast doubt on the authority of its claims. If even members of the move-
ment cannot agree among themselves, why should anyone else be moved 
by it? The British antislavery movement had to forge an agenda around 
which its members could rally. It chose at first to focus on abolishing the 
slave trade rather than slavery itself, in part to bring along people who 
were reluctant to take more radical steps. Criticism of the slave trade was 
better grounded in Biblical morality than criticism of slavery. (The Bible 
clearly condemns manstealing, while it accommodates slavery.) The slave 
trade also tied the interests of slaves to the British, for the trade’s cruelty 
also encompassed seamen, who also suffered brutal punishments and high 
death rates in the Middle Passage, as greedy captains would neglect the 
health of the men with whom they would have to share the profits when 
the slaves were sold.25 Once the people were rallied against the slave trade, 
and won its abolition, they were more receptive to joining the next phase, 
against slavery. The British antislavery movement had the discipline to 
remain united enough at any given time to move the moral opinion of 
their society forward.
On the naturalistic account of moral change I am offering, conten-
tious politics is a major engine of moral progress. The particular mode of 
contentious politics known as the social movement is a particularly apt 
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vehicle of progressive moral transformation, because it enables people to 
undertake the three tasks needed to overcome a principal source of moral 
bias: the tendency of the powerful to shape and uphold moral norms that 
confuse the right with what the powerful desire for themselves. Through 
social movements, people inform the powerful and the public at large of 
how the needs and interests of the less powerful are ill-served by reigning 
norms. They demonstrate their own moral worth and commitment, and 
thereby bolster the moral authority of their claim-making. They expose 
the powerful and the public at large to the characteristic experiences that 
stimulate moral conscience and moral reflection: being held accountable 
for the bad consequences of their conduct, experiencing others challenge 
the authority of the norms they are upholding, finding themselves unable to 
offer a justification for their actions that others accept, observing the hold 
of their norms on others dissolve, so as to undermine the ability of these 
norms to settle interpersonal conflicts, feeling their own moral authority 
undermined. As the challenged norm loses authority in the eyes of those 
it is supposed to govern, it loses support. This is an occasion for practical 
deliberation, to search for new norms that can better manage interpersonal 
claims in ways that serve the interests of all.
4. Free Labor as an Experiment in Living
My argument does not imply that social movements are infallible 
tools of moral progress. Where they have room to act, they can be effec-
tive tools for exposing and dislodging unjust social norms that embody 
the characteristic moral biases of the powerful. But they are no more 
guaranteed to deliver superior moral norms than the clinical trial is guar-
anteed to deliver reliable causal knowledge of the effectiveness of drugs 
for particular diseases. Social movements must offer alternatives to the 
norms they challenge. Those alternatives may contain defects not antici-
pated or appreciated by the movements themselves. Hence the ultimate test 
of moral progress must lie in critical reflection on the results of a social 
movement, in the experiences of those living under the new norms that 
an effective social movement establishes.
British abolitionism offers an outstanding case study in this regard, 
partly because it was explicitly understood as an experiment in living. To 
understand this, we must consider what problem the slave system was 
thought to solve. Until the mid-18th century, the dominant assumption 
was that people would not work unless they were forced. About 95% of 
the world’s population labored under one kind or another of involuntary 
servitude: if not outright slavery, then serfdom, debt peonage, apprentice-
ship, indenture, corvée, military impressment, penal servitude or other 
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forms of coercion, such as coolie labor.26 Even the workers who were 
called “free” would not be considered free by today’s standards. Until 
the mid-to-late 19th century, labor law in the English speaking world 
bound “free” workers to one year contracts to their employers. Employ-
ers were entitled to withhold the entire year’s pay until the 365th day of 
service was satisfactorily delivered, and could withhold any portion of it 
as a penalty for unsatisfactory or incomplete service. If a worker moon-
lighted, his contractual employer was entitled to confiscate all her wages 
paid by other employers. If she tried to quit, she was not entitled to seek 
work with another employer. Her original employer was entitled to sue 
for her return. To be unemployed, able-bodied, and without property was 
to commit the crime of vagrancy, the punishment for which was penal 
servitude. The destitute could be forced into workhouses.27 In the dominant 
labor regimes across the world, slavery was but the most extreme case 
in a spectrum of involuntary servitude, with so-called free workers still 
situated well inside the involuntary line as we would draw it today. From 
today’s perspective, the only fully free workers were the self-employed: 
yeoman farmers, independent craftsmen, shopkeepers, and the like.
The norms enforcing all forms of involuntary servitude were seen 
as necessary for securing economic arrangements whereby society can 
sustain itself. Call this “the problem of production.” Every society needs 
to solve it. Occasionally defenders of involuntary servitude argued that if 
the slaves were freed, they would starve.28 That was absurd. More com-
monly, they suggested that emancipation would let the slaves fall into 
“barbarism.”29 They meant that, given the chance, the slaves, just like 
most people, would work only for their own subsistence, as peasants, 
hunters, or vagabonds. A population that quits work the moment it meets 
its bare subsistence needs will not produce a surplus. Without a surplus, 
a society cannot support occupations beyond subsistence: there will be no 
manufacturers, merchants, or financiers, no artists or scientists, no clergy 
or educators, no writers or publishers, no magistrates, civil servants, or 
navy. In other words, without a surplus, there is no civilization. Involuntary 
servitude was seen as a necessary solution to the version of the problem 
of production faced by civilized societies — that is, societies with an 
advanced division of labor.
Note that even if this argument for forced labor were sound, it could 
not justify a labor regime as cruel and exploitative as chattel slavery. Be-
yond being a system of involuntary servitude, slavery adds four additional 
gross injustices. First, slaves are subject to extreme violence at the hands 
of their masters. Second, they lack nearly all the rights constitutive of legal 
personhood, such as the right to own property, make contracts, sue and 
be sued, and bear witness in court. Third, slaves suffer “natal alienation”: 
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they have no right to family relations — to marry (in many slave regimes), 
raise their children, or commune with any other kin. Fourth, symbolically 
it is the most dishonored status ascribed to any human permitted to remain 
within society: the slave is socially dead to everyone else.30 Since far less 
abusive forms of involuntary servitude had already proven capable of 
supporting “civilization” as then understood, the argument as it stands 
falls far short of justifying slavery.
Contemporary arguments over slavery in relation to the problem of 
production focused on two different objections. Some moralists argued 
that even if it were true that a population would not willingly produce a 
surplus, that could not justify forcing them to give up their subsistence 
lifestyle to serve the interests of civilization. It was wrong to sacrifice the 
happiness of slaves even if involuntary servitude was the only way to get 
them to produce a surplus.31
Other opponents of slavery rejected the premise that involuntary ser-
vitude was necessary to support the advanced division of labor needed to 
sustain civilized society. Adam Smith made the most influential argument 
on this point. In economic terms, the argument for forced labor supposes 
that the supply curve of labor is backward-bending: higher compensation 
would lead workers to reduce their labor supply, because they could meet 
their subsistence target with fewer hours of labor. Smith argued that the 
supply curve of labor is forward-sloping: offer people wages high enough 
to give them the prospect of real improvement of their condition, and they 
will work harder. Free labor is more productive than slave labor because 
the free worker has an incentive to work. Force is needed to make slaves 
work hard for their masters because masters deny them the opportunity 
to improve their condition beyond subsistence no matter how hard they 
work.32 The appearance of a backward-bending supply curve of labor is 
a byproduct of slavery, not an innate disposition of slaves or human be-
ings generally. Smith articulated the Enlightenment view that the march 
of freedom and civilization went hand-in-hand. The right to one’s own 
labor is “sacred and inviolable.” Recognizing that right, far from entailing 
a sacrifice of economic progress, advances economic growth, personal 
independence, and good government.33
The abolitionists did not rest their case against slavery on economic 
grounds; for them the argument was fundamentally a moral one. But 
antislavery M.P.s and ministers were eager to demonstrate that the aboli-
tion of slavery would be compatible with the continued productivity of 
the colonial plantations dedicated to tropical cash crops such as coffee, 
indigo, and most importantly, sugar. For them, the abolition of slavery was 
a “mighty experiment” in free labor, as Edward Stanley (later Lord Derby), 
the Colonial Secretary described it, when he moved the emancipation 
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resolution before the House of Commons on May 14, 1833.34 The British 
government hoped that a rigorous demonstration that free labor could be 
just as productive as slave labor in the colonies would demonstrate the 
compatibility of free labor with economic progress, and help persuade the 
other slaveholding nations to give up slavery.
The emancipation bill provided for a transitional labor system, called 
“apprenticeship,” which lasted until 1838. Slaves in the West Indian 
colonies and Mauritius were bound to serve their former masters for a 
specified number of hours per day during this period. The apprenticeship 
experiment offered cautious reasons for hope. The slave colonies had been 
weakened by a slave revolt before emancipation; apprenticeship ushered 
in a period of labor peace and allowed rebuilding of the plantations. The 
freed people enjoyed a higher standard of living. While sugar production 
declined 10%, profits rose because the price of sugar increased 40%.35 
However, wherever open land was available, freed people left the planta-
tions to set up their own independent system of smallholder production, 
favoring subsistence agriculture and producing cash crops only after 
subsistence needs were met.
Seven years after the end of apprenticeship, sugar production was 
35% below the levels that had been produced under slavery. Because 
British West Indies sugar was protected by tariffs from competition with 
slave-produced sugar, the British paid twice the price for West Indies sugar 
than what others paid for Cuban sugar. The freed people’s wages were 
high, but this provoked resentment from British workers, who compared 
their lot as “wage slaves” unfavorably to the freed people and objected 
that they were forced to subsidize their high standard of living through an 
artificially high price of sugar. Meanwhile, slave-based sugar production in 
Cuba dramatically outpaced the British West Indies not only quantitatively 
but technologically, through the adoption of advanced machinery and 
railroads. Free trade advocates argued that there was no justification for 
protecting British sugar over Cuban and Brazilian slave-produced sugar. 
If free labor was really superior to slave, it should be able to compete on 
a level playing field.36
In 1846, Parliament accepted the free traders’ argument, equalized 
sugar duties between its own colonies and foreign imports, and thereby 
triggered an economic crisis in the uncompetitive British West Indies. 
Many plantations declared bankruptcy; merchant houses were ruined; and 
freed people’s wages fell. This led to a further flow of labor from planta-
tions to peasant production, wherever, as in Jamaica, land was available for 
freed people to claim. Competition with slave production did not support 
a progressive march of freedom, as had been hoped by Smith’s followers. 
Rather, it led plantation owners in the “free labor” colonies to impose 
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alternative forms of labor coercion on sugar workers. In Java, the Dutch 
forced peasant farmers to grow sugar by imposing taxes that could be paid 
only from plantation wages. In the British colonies, planters imported 
indentured coolie labor from Asia. The emancipation experiment was 
widely regarded as a falsification of Smith’s productivity-based defense 
of free labor, at least as applied to blacks.37
Why did slave labor produce more, and more cheaply, than free? In 
part, the lash turned out to be a cheaper motivator than the wage from the 
planter’s point of view. The brutal economics of sugar production gave the 
slave system additional advantages. Once cane ripens it must be quickly 
harvested and refined before it rots. Sugar refining was the first mass pro-
duction process invented in the Industrial Revolution, involving dangerous 
machinery to crush the cane and boil the juice to refine it into sugar. Maxi-
mizing productivity thus demanded grueling, intense, continuous labor 
under a relentless sun or before sweltering boilers. No free worker of any 
race was willing to work so hard for any wage, because the productivity-
maximizing level of labor per worker was so continuous and exhausting 
that it left no time or energy to enjoy any leisure, and destroyed workers’ 
health and lives. Stephen Cave, the Chair of the West Indies Committee, 
reported that Cuban slaves were forced to work continuously 18 hours 
per day, 7 days per week. Free Jamaicans were only willing to work at 
this debilitating labor 6 hours per day, 4 days per week.38 Jamaican free 
workers needed enough wages and time to feed and raise their children; 
Cuban plantation owners could work their slaves to death and seize new 
adult workers from Africa, thereby obtaining at low cost not just the labor 
of their slaves but the childrearing labor of Africans.
The calculus of productivity used to refute Smith’s arguments favoring 
free over slave labor gave a grossly incomplete accounting of the costs of 
slave labor. It failed to account for the costs to the slaves of working so 
intensely, and the costs to Africans of having their children stolen away. 
The advocates of so-called “free trade,” who demanded equal tariffs for 
free and slave sugar so that the lowest cost producer would win the com-
petition, were therefore inconsistent. In what sense can trade be free if one 
group of competitors steals its most important inputs? By that standard, 
free traders should also have advocated free competition between honest 
producers and gangsters who sell stolen goods. Free trade is nonsensical 
except against the background of legally enforced property rights — in-
cluding, most importantly, the rights of workers to freely decide how to 
dispose of their own labor. 
Many skeptics of free trade also pronounced the free labor experiment 
a failure. They blamed the freed people for preferring barbarism to civili-
zation, for rejecting the work ethic and the promise of self-improvement 
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through wage labor. Theories of racial inferiority, virtually absent in the 
Parliamentary debates over emancipation, were advanced to explain the 
failure of free blacks to willingly live up to the demands of the civilizing 
process. Thomas Carlyle exemplified the trend in his notorious “Occa-
sional Discourse on the Nigger Question.”39 He assailed free West Indian 
blacks for refusing to work for plantation owners when they could grow 
“pumpkins” for themselves with far less effort: this showed they were 
indolent and slaves to sin. Whites, being wiser than blacks, were their 
natural lords. Whites were also entitled to all the land of the West Indies 
because they were the ones who maximized spice production on the is-
lands. They should force blacks to work on the plantations:
no black man who will not work according to what ability the 
gods have given him for working, has the smallest right to eat 
pumpkin, or to any fraction of land that will grow pumpkin . . . 
but has an indisputable and perpetual right to be compelled, by 
the real proprietors of said land, to do competent work for his 
living. . . . If it be his own indolence that prevents and prohibits 
him, then his own indolence is the enemy he must be delivered 
from: and the first “right” he has, poor, indolent blockhead, black 
or white, is, that every unprohibited man, whatsoever wiser, more 
industrious person may be passing that way, shall endeavor to 
“emancipate” him from his indolence, and by some wise means, 
as I said, compel him, since inducing will not serve, to do the 
work he is fit for . . . . this is the eternal law of nature for a man.40
Carlyle rejected free market premises in favor of the traditional Christian 
moral discourse of sin and the “gospel of work” — a discourse that lay at 
the center of Christian justifications for slavery.41
John Stuart Mill mocked Carlyle’s argument. It was absurd for Car-
lyle to ascribe greater “industry” to whites, or to claim that whites had 
made the islands productive, when blacks performed all the labor for idle 
white planters.42 More importantly, Mill contested Carlyle’s standard of 
success for the emancipation experiment. Carlyle’s standard rested on 
fulfillment of a purported duty of ceaseless toil in the name of civiliza-
tion. Mill replied that the value of work must be measured by the value 
of its product, in comparison with the cost to the laborer of providing 
the labor. In the West Indies, human beings were worked to death for the 
frivolous luxury of sugar: 
Is it the verdict of the “immortal gods” that pepper is noble, 
freedom (even freedom from the lash) contemptible? . . . . [T]
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he multiplication of work, for purposes not worth caring about, 
is one of the evils of our present condition. When justice and 
reason shall be the rule of human affairs, one of the first things 
to which we may expect them to be applied is the question, How 
many of the so-called luxuries, conveniences, refinements, and 
ornaments of life, are worth the labour which must be undergone 
as the condition of producing them? . . . . In opposition to the 
“gospel of work,” I would assert the gospel of leisure, and main-
tain that human beings cannot rise to the finer attributes of their 
nature compatibly with a life filled with labour. . . . To reduce 
very greatly the quantity of work required to carry on existence, 
is as needful as to distribute it more equally; and the progress 
of science, and the increasing ascendancy of justice and good 
sense, tend to this result.43
Even if it were true that sugar production fueled civilization — that is, 
“commerces, arts, polities, and social developments” — political and social 
arrangements based on the exploitation of slaves are a curse to humanity.44 
Those who labor to produce the characteristic goods of civilization are 
entitled to sufficient leisure, income, and freedom to enjoy its benefits. By 
this standard, the relative leisure and prosperity of the freed people of the 
West Indies counted as a great success of the emancipation experiment.
In the decades following emancipation, observers struggled over the 
right criterion of success for the experiment. If the standard was whether 
free labor could produce tropical cash crops more cheaply to white plant-
ers and consumers than slave labor, then the experiment had failed. That 
standard was relevant for the prospect of persuading slave states to give 
up slavery peacefully. But it could never serve as a standard of justice. 
The British government’s desire to press the narrowly economic case for 
abolition along with the moral case proved an embarrassment. 
If the standard was whether “civilization” — production of a surplus 
that could sustain an advanced division of labor — could continue to 
progress without slavery, the experiment succeeded, although not quite in 
the ways observers at the time, even abolitionists, appreciated. Carlyle’s 
perverse “gospel of labor” led to a persistent disparagement of the peas-
ant production model that the freed people aspired to. Except for radicals 
like Mill, most European observers saw this as a reversion to barbarism, 
proof that blacks were not ready for freedom. For the blacks themselves, 
independent peasant production embodied the very promise of freedom: 
to be free was not to be subject to any master, but to govern oneself in 
one’s own production decisions. Nor was it true that the freed people’s 
labor supply curves bent backward as soon as they met their subsistence 
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needs. While they gave subsistence priority and cut back on their labor 
hours — obviously rational choices, given that the slave regime had been 
working and starving them to death — they also produced export crops.45 
Ultimately the disagreement between Smith and his opponents was not 
over whether the supply of labor bends backwards or forwards. For all 
human beings there must be a level at which it bends backwards: people 
need time and energy to enjoy their pay or it will not benefit them at all. 
Hence the incentive effects of higher pay must at some point run out and 
be unable to elicit further effort. The real question is whether these effects 
run out at bare subsistence or at some higher point, consistent with produc-
tion of a surplus sufficient to support an advanced division of labor. Smith 
was correct to argue that the inflection point lies well above subsistence.
Hence, cash crop production continued in the British West Indies, 
albeit at somewhat lower levels than at their peak under slavery. Moreover, 
the importance of tropical cash crops in the British economy declined as 
industrialization accelerated. This meant that the economic criteria for the 
success of the experiment eventually receded. The stakes in slavery were 
not, and never had been, whether civilization could progress without it. In 
the end they amounted to nothing more than a question of the relative price 
of sugar to white consumers, and the profitability of sugar production to 
white planters. If wages must be paid to free black and Asian workers to 
induce them to produce tropical staples, then of course the relative price 
of these staples will rise compared to the price of slave-produced staples.46
Many whites failed to grasp this point, because their own framing of 
the problem that slavery had been called upon to solve continued to reflect 
the confusion between the parochial good of the powerful and the morally 
right that is the characteristic moral bias of social superiors. Carlyle even 
claimed that the supposed duty of blacks to toil unremittingly for whites 
was God’s law. Such is the narcissism of the powerful that they confuse 
their own depraved and selfish desires with divinely ordained morality, and 
make themselves gods in imposing oppressive laws on their subordinates.
Even the British abolitionists were not fully immune to this bias. 
If the standard of success for emancipation had been whether people could 
flourish on the basis of a completely free labor system, the experiment was 
not yet tried. For wherever slavery was abolished, it was not immediately 
replaced by anything we would recognize today as a free labor system. 
The abolitionists themselves acquiesced in the importation of indentured 
servants as a substitute for slaves in the British West Indies, and were 
roundly criticized at home for neglecting the horrors of wage slavery.47 
For this reason, we cannot view the transformation of moral consciousness 
brought about by abolitionism as like the scales falling from the eyes of 
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those affected. It was more like experiencing the earliest light of dawn. 
Or, as Mill put the point:
The history of human improvement is the record of a struggle 
by which inch after inch of ground has been wrung from these 
maleficent powers, and more and more of human life rescued 
from the iniquitous dominion of the law of might. Much, very 
much of this work still remains to do, but the progress made in it 
is the best and greatest achievement yet performed by mankind.48
The abolition of slavery was only one great step in the struggle for free 
labor, recognition of the wrongness of slavery only the first great step in 
grasping the demands of justice in the realm of production. The struggle 
continues to this day. 
Let us return, then, to the question of moral epistemology. How do we 
know, without begging the question in favor of our current moral beliefs, 
that the great change from accepting to condemning slavery was a case of 
moral progress? First, we have good reason to believe that moral support 
for the institution of slavery was based on a massive confusion on the part 
of the powerful between the morally right and their own self-interest. In-
sulated from the kinds of moral pressure that could correct their confusion 
and undermine their own narcissistic claims of moral authority, and from 
information about the full range of interests at stake in slavery, the moral 
views of those with stakes in the slave system were unreliable. Second, 
we have good reason to believe that the abolitionist social movement 
possessed features that, if they managed to move the moral opinions of 
society, would tend to correct the ignorance and confusion of the powerful, 
whose views held sway until then. The abolitionists exposed information 
about slavery and the slave trade, especially concerning its brutality, that 
was not salient before, and that was acknowledged as morally relevant 
by the standards of the time. They exposed the powerful to experiences 
of moral accountability, felt loss of moral authority, and destabilization 
of the norms they upheld — the sorts of experiences needed to jar moral 
deliberation and to make clear to them (and to those who complacently or 
habitually followed them) the distinction between the morally right and 
mere self-interest. Their change in view from acceptance to condemnation 
of slavery was therefore brought about by processes that we have good 
reason to believe tend to lead to better informed, less partial and narcis-
sistic moral views. Third, experience with the new institutions of (quasi-)
free labor that replaced slavery demonstrated that they were compatible 
with the progress of civilization, understood as economic development 
and an advanced division of labor. Economic development under the freer 
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labor regimes also prompted a revision of the ideal of civilization that 
incorporated the interests of workers, considered as proper beneficiaries 
of its fruits and not merely instruments for creating it. This revision was 
difficult to resist given the background belief, accepted by all sides, that 
all members of society are entitled to moral consideration. How could the 
ideal of civilization promoted by slave interests claim credibility when 
it gratuitously denied a great mass of workers sustaining civilization any 
share in its fruits?
Can we draw some more general lessons about moral progress from 
our case study of British abolitionism? I have not argued that social move-
ments are always right, not even when they succeed. They have tendencies 
to correct moral bias and confusion — but only when they speak truth to 
power. Reactionary movements, which attempt to impose disadvantages 
on the less powerful, have no tendency to correct the confusion, more often 
held by the relatively powerful, between self-interest and the moral right. 
Movements that try to effect change by promulgating false or misleading 
claims also have no tendency to correct ignorance. And even when social 
movements succeed in exposing defects in the status quo, they do not al-
ways supply an alternative that successfully manages the problems people 
confront, with acceptable side effects. This is another reason why ex ante 
moral arguments, however persuasive, are not reliable in the absence of 
experiments in living that vindicate them. Ultimately, moral claims, like 
factual claims, need to be tested in experience.
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4. Hochschild, Bury the Chains, loc. 1250, 2067.
5. Newton, Thoughts upon the African Slave Trade, 1, 4.
6. John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, reprint, 1932, 
The Later Works, 1925–1953 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1981), I.4.
7. “[A]s an idea, “right” introduces an element which is quite outside that 
of the good. This element is that of exaction, demand . . . . The idea of wrong 
introduces an independent factor: that the act is from the standpoint of moral 
authority a refusal to meet a legitimate demand. There has to be an idea of the 
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authoritative claim of what is reasonable in order to convert the Good into the 
Right . . . . The Good is that which attracts; the Right is that which asserts that 
we ought to be drawn by some object whether we are naturally attracted to it or 
not.” Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 216.
8. “Even if all men agreed sincerely to act upon the principle of the Golden 
Rule as the supreme law of conduct, we should still need inquiry and thought to 
arrive at even a passable conception of what the Rule means in terms of concrete 
practice under mixed and changing social conditions. Universal agreement upon 
the abstract principle even if it existed would be of value only as a preliminary to 
cooperative undertaking of investigation and thoughtful planning; as a prepara-
tion, in other words, for systematic and consistent reflection.” Dewey and Tufts, 
Ethics, 178.
9. We could imagine a stateless group regulating its members’ withdrawals of 
resources from common pools by means of nonlegal moral norms. For purposes 
of this exposition, the distinction between moral and legal norms is not critical.
10. “Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is 
right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges 
when men are confronted with situations in which different desires promise op-
posed goods and in which incompatible courses of action seem to be morally 
justified. . . . For what is called moral theory is but a more conscious and system-
atic raising of the question which occupies the mind of any one who in the face 
of moral conflict and doubt seeks a way out through reflection. In short, moral 
theory is but an extension of what is involved in all reflective morality.” Dewey 
and Tufts, Ethics, 164.
11. “The difference between customary and reflective morality is precisely 
that definite precepts, rules, definitive injunctions and prohibitions issue from the 
former, while they cannot proceed from the latter.” Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 166.
12. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 226.
13. Table-turning exercises may also help the relatively powerful literally 
feel the pain and discomfort of the disadvantaged, and thereby learn to respond 
to it more appropriately. At Beatitudes Campus, an assisted living residence in 
Arizona, staff members have received the forms of care they give to demented 
patients — being spoon-fed, being bathed, even using adult diapers — so as to 
personally experience the feelings of distress and threat often caused by unaware 
caretakers. They learn that when demented patients express anger toward or 
physically resist certain forms of care, this may be their way of communicating 
pain, rather than manifesting a combative and disruptive disposition. They learn 
to read difficult-to-manage behavior as a kind of claim-making, to discern what 
kind of claims it is making, and to avoid framing this behavior as “resistance to 
needed care” but rather as signalling “incompetent care.” Rebecca Mead, “The 
Sense of an Ending,” The New Yorker, 20 May 2013, 99–100.
14. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 4.
15. I stress that not all violent action, even if it has political aims, amounts 
to contention. Often it is simply an attempt to get one’s way, without bothering 
to treat the objects of violence or anyone else as addressees of moral claims. 
Nevertheless, many violent acts are attempts to make claims in ways that the 
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addressees cannot ignore. For example, many urban riots in inner cities since the 
Civil Rights Movement have protested police brutality and express a demand to 
bring the police to trial and to reform police methods. 
16. Margaret Gilbert, “Modeling Collective Belief,” Synthese 73 (1987): 192–5.
17. Whether it loses its power depends on whether the mode of conten-
tion involves direct disobedience of the challenged norm, or other actions that 
undermine its point. Petitioning the government to abolish slavery did not entail 
directly disobeying the laws supporting slavery and so did not in itself undermine 
the continued operation of slavery. However, various forms of slave resistance, 
such as escape and revolt, directly assaulted the institution of slavery. The British 
abolitionists’ boycott of slave-grown sugar indirectly attacked the slave system 
by undermining its profitability.
18. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions 
Happen (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 113–18 stresses this third honor-based 
source of the power of the abolitionist movement in addressing elites, although he 
also points to the importance of considerations of honor in mobilizing participa-
tion in the movement itself.
19. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 111.
20. Hochschild, Bury the Chains, loc. 154–62.
21. Hochschild, Bury the Chains, loc. 3008, 3635, 5083.
22. Seymour Drescher, The Mighty Experiment: Free Labor Versus Slavery 
in British Emancipation (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88; 
Hochschild, Bury the Chains, loc. 2921–26, 2966–71.
23. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 79–81, 128. Racist attitudes certainly 
supported British slavery, and were expressed in other venues. However, it is 
telling that racist ideology lacked moral authority in Parliament in the early 19th 
century, although it would be a powerful force there by the middle of the century.
24. Charles Tilly, Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties (Boulder, Col.: 
Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 216–17.
25. Hochschild, Bury the Chains, loc. 1504, 1783–1812.
26. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 14.
27. Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Develop-
ment in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 3.
28. St. George Tucker, Dissertation on Slavery with a Proposal for the 
Gradual Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia (Philadelphia: Mathew Carey, 
1796), loc. 588.
29. Eric Foner, Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), loc. 612; Drescher, The Mighty 
Experiment, 57.
30. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 2–13.
31. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 135.
32. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, 5th. ed. (London: Methuen and Co., 1904), I.8, Library of Economics 
and Liberty, Http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Smith/smWN.html.
33. Smith, Wealth of Nations, I.10.2, III.4.
34. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 123.
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36. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 158, 153, 161–2, 186.
37. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 175, 173.
38. Drescher, The Mighty Experiment, 203.
39. Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas 
Bosworth, 1853).
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41. David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca: 
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